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Synopsis
Formal semantics, today a self-standing discipline, emerged
at the interface of logic and philosophy of language in the
early 1970’s, as a result of using the tools provided by logic
to study natural language. In this paper, we start by offering
a quick glance at those early developments, paying less atten-
tion to the historical aspects than to the philosophical motiva-
tions, in particular to truth-conditionality and compositional-
ity. We then put forward a very basic model-theoretic appara-
tus for the treatment of intensional constructions (modal and
temporal operators) as well as a class of context-dependent
constructions (indexicals), following the analysis provided by
David Kaplan in the 1970’s and widely endorsed nowadays.
There is a great variety of issues that have to do with context-
dependence and its impact on truth-conditional approaches to
natural language, some thoroughly studied ever since (e.g. pre-
supposition, anaphora), others having emerged more recently
(e.g. gradable adjectives, derogatory terms, etc.), a discussion
of which would go beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, we
will focus on the interaction between context-dependence and
logical truth. For example, the sentence “This red flower is
red” contains the demonstrative ‘this’ and is context-dependent.
Yet, if someone says this pointing to a red flower, not only will
they say something true, but it seems that the truth thereby
expressed is already secured by the meaning of the sentence
(and the conditions under which it can be felicitously uttered).
Could, then, this truth be a matter of logic? To take another
example, if someone says “It is snowing”, can we infer “It is
actually snowing here and now”? And, if inference there is,
will it be a logical inference? The aim of the present paper is
not to provide firm answers to such questions, but rather, to
point out issues that arise when we think of logical truth as
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truth in virtue of meaning, and when we try to reconcile this
idea with the fact that the use of language is highly context-
dependent.
1 The model-theoretic approach to meaning
It is often believed that Gottlob Frege (1848-1925) is the “father” of mod-
ern logic as well as of philosophy of language.1 But it was arguably
Richard Montague (1930-1971) who set out to propose a systematized for-
mal approach to natural language. The first two thirds of the 20th century
(or equivalently, the time that elapsed since Frege’s work until Montague’s
work) were nevertheless marked by significant progress in the realm of for-
mal logic, and model-theory in particular. At the time at which Montague
and his contemporaries, like David Lewis and Max Cresswell, started lay-
ing down the foundations for natural language semantics, the semantics
for formal languages had already been in place, and well-developed. The
title of one of Montagues’ pioneering paper, English as a Formal Lan-
guage, aptly captures precisely the gist of Montague’s approach. Until
then, it was a widespread conviction, as much among philosophers or lo-
gicians as among linguists, that there is an unbridgeable gap between, on
the one hand, the language of logic, mathematics, and possibly science,
whose sentences, or formulae, can be given precise truth conditions and
allow for formal and model-theoretic analyses, and, on the other, natural
languages such as English, Chinese, or Bengali, which were believed to be
too hectic, too “imperfect”, to be formally tractable.2 The gist of the Mon-
tagovian program and, in that respect, of the field of formal semantics qua
a discipline of linguistics, is to challenge this conviction, and to apply the
same sort of analysis that had been made available for formal languages,
to ordinary language.
One of the central tenets of natural language semantics, and, more gen-
1For logic, the most relevant source is Frege’s Begriffsschrift (Frege 1879), while for
philosophy of language, it is Uber Sinn und Bedeutung (Frege 1892). On Frege being
perceived as the founder of logic and semantics, e.g. Heim and Kratzer 1998, a widely
used introduction to formal semantic, write: “[Frege’s] work marked the beginning of both
symbolic logic and the formal semantics of natural language” (p. 2).
2Frege himself was convinced of a deep cleavage between the two families of language.
He wrote e.g.: “If our language were logically more perfect, we would perhaps have no
further need of logic, or we might read it off from the language. But we are far from being
in such a position. Work in logic just is, to a large extent, a struggle with the logical defects
of language” (1915, p.323).
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erally, of philosophy of language of the analytic tradition, is the idea that
meaning should be cashed out in terms of truth conditions.3 To illustrate
the idea with a simple example, consider:
1 Annie owns a car.
What does it take to understand (1)? The basic idea on which truth-
conditional approaches rely is that in order to understand (1), one ought to
know what the world must be like for (1) to come out true. One need not
know whether (1) is true – rather, one needs to know that (1) is true in those
and only those situations in which Annie owns a car. Note that there can be
a variety of such situations. Annie might own a red car or a white car; she
might own a Ferrari or a Honda; she might own a car she never drives; she
might own a dozen of cars. The meaning of (1) does not distinguish among
those situations. All that is required to understand (1) is to know that some
such situation – one in which there is a car owned by Annie – must obtain
for (1) to be true.
The second equally central tenet of natural language semantics is the
idea that the meaning of a complex expression E can be obtained from the
meanings of the simple expressions of which E is composed, and the way
they compose it. Note that I have stated the idea somewhat vaguely; this is
because the issue itself of how the idea is to be formulated is under contro-
versy. The assumption endorsed by truth-conditional semantics is, simply,
that meaning is compositional, but the question of what exactly composi-
tionality amounts to is, to a certain extent, an open question. For our pur-
poses, we may leave the question open, and simply retain that when S is a
complex sentence composed of simpler sentences S1:::Sn, the truth-values
of S1:::Sn (with respect to the appropriate parameters) help determine the
truth-value of S (with respect to the same or to some other appropriately
related parameters). We will shortly see what this idea amounts to.
Let us wrap up this introductory section with a rough, somewhat sim-
plified outline of semantics for a fragment of a language like English. A
semantic framework for a language (natural or formal) may be thought of
as a system such that, if you give it a sentence, it will return a truth value.
But of course, before it can return a truth value, it will ask for further in-
puts. First and foremost, it will ask for a structure of interpretation. In
the case of first order logic (FOL), the structure of interpretation consists
simply of a set of individuals U, the universe, and of a certain function,
3On the relationship between meaning and truth conditions, see e.g. Davidson 1967.
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the interpretation function, which takes non-logical symbols either to ele-
ments of U (when the symbol is an individual constant) or to subsets of U
(when the symbol is a monadic predicate) or to sets of n-tuples of individ-
uals from U (when it is an n-place predicate). For example, the sentence
in (1) can already be formalized in FOL using the existential quantifier 9,
a monadic predicate ‘car’, a two-place predicate ‘own’, and an individual
constant ‘Annie’: 9x(car(x) ^ owns(Annie; x)). This formula will be
true in those and only those structures in which the intersection of the in-
terpretation of the monadic predicate ‘car’ and of the set of things to which
the interpretation of the name ‘Annie’ is related by the interpretation of the
two-place predicate ‘own’ is not empty.
Now, even in FOL, the system sometimes cannot return a truth value
even when we give it a structure of interpretation. That happens when the
input sentence contains free variables. And that is presumably what will
happen, too, if we gave the semantic system for natural language a sentence
that contains (unbound) pronouns. Consider:
2 She owns a car.
Relative to one and the same structure of interpretation, (2) may be true
and false. For instance, let “our” structure (one that adequately interprets
English and is based on the actual state of affairs) be such that Annie owns
a car while Betty doesn’t. Then (2) will be true with respect to the assign-
ment function that assigns Annie to the free variable that stands for ‘she’,
and false with respect to the one that assigns Betty to the same variable.
Crucially, FOL is unable to deal with intensional modal expressions such
as ‘it is possible that’ and ‘it is necessary that’. Nor can it deal with inten-
sional temporal expressions such as ‘it has been the case that’ or ‘it will be
the case that’. Reconsider (1) and suppose that our world is one in which
Annie owns no car. We want to say that (1), while false when evaluated
with respect to our own world, is true when evaluated with respect to some
possible world in which she owns a car. Similarly, suppose that Annie
doesn’t own a car yet, but then gets one in 2015. Then we want to say that
(1) is false if evaluated with respect to year 2010, but true if evaluated with
respect to 2015. Now consider:
3 It might have been the case that Annie owned a car.
4 It will be the case that Annie owns a car.
We also want to say that (3), evaluated with respect to our world, the
actual world, is true, because there is a possible world in which the sentence
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in (1) is true, and because the sentence in (1) is, syntactically, a constituent
of the more complex sentence in (3), in which it is embedded under the
possibility operator. Similarly, we want to say that (4), evaluated with
respect to the present time, is true, because there is a later time at which
(1), embedded under the temporal operator in (4), is true.
Structures of interpretation for languages that contain intensional modal
and temporal operators will thus specify not only a universe of individuals,
but also a set of possible worlds (together with an “accessibility” relation
on that set) and a set of times (together with an ordering “earlier-later” re-
lation on that set). The interpretation function will now send an n-place
predicate not just to a set of n-tuples of individuals from U, but to a map-
ping from world-time pairs to such sets. So, if we now give the system a
sentence, expecting a truth value in return, the system will ask for a struc-
ture of interpretation, an assignment function, as well as a world of evalu-
ation and a time of evaluation. The following notation means that sentence
' is true with respect to structure S, world w, time t, and assignment f of
values to the free variables:
[[']]Sw;t;f = T
So, for instance, the recursive truth definition of the possibility operator
3 as in (3) can be expressed in the following way:
[[3']]Sw;t;f = T iff there isw
0 accessible fromw such that [[']]Sw0;t;f = T
Similarly, the recursive truth definition of the temporal ‘later than’ oper-
ator FUT as in (4) can be expressed as follows:
[[FUT']]Sw;t;f = T
iff there is t0 later than t[[']]Sw;t0;f = T
These definitions illustrate both truth-conditionality and compositional-
ity. The idea that meaning is compositional is reflected through the fact
that the meaning of a complex sentence of the form ‘it might have been the
case that '’ is a function of the meaning of the operator ‘it might have been
the case that’ and of ' (and similarly, mutatis mutandis, for the operator ’it
will be the case that’). The truth-conditionality is, in turn, reflected through
the fact that the meaning of the operator ‘it might have been the case that’
tells you under which conditions the complex sentence is true, given the
conditions under which the embedded sentence is true.
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2 Making room for context-dependence in
truth-conditional semantics
It was believed for a long time that context-dependent expressions can-
not, and should not, be part of any language for which a rigorous, truth-
conditional analysis is to be provided. But since the 1970’s, considerable
attention has been paid to such context-dependent constructions, and to the
possible ways of incorporating them into formal frameworks. Hans Kamp
(1971) and Frank Vlach (1973) were among the first to realize that the
adverb ‘now’ posed a problem for tense logic, or, more precisely, those
frameworks of tense logic that deploy a single time coordinate (as does the
framework sketched in the previous section). To give you a flavor of the
problem, consider this pair of sentences:
5 Maria said that she would call.
6 Maria said that she would call now.
The contrast between (5) and (6) shows that the word ‘now’ in English
is not vacuous. For (5) to be true, there needs to be some time in the past at
which Maria said that at some future time she would call; this future time
can be some time or any other, it doesn’t matter. On the other hand, for (6)
to be true, there needs to be some time in the past at which Maria said that
at some specific future time she would call; and this time is no other than
the one at which (6) is being said and evaluated for truth.4
As another example that similarly requires amending the simple, stan-
dard sort of framework that deploys a single time coordinate, consider5
7 Someday everything that is flourishing will be faded.
The sentence in (7) is ambiguous. On one reading its “non–charitable”
reading it says that at some point in future, everything that is flourishing
4It should be noted that while Kamp argues that the indexical ’now’ cannot be straight-
forwardly handled within tense logic, he explicitly notes that if we use variables for times,
then we should be able to capture the relevant sense of (6). He writes: “I of course ex-
clude the possibility of symbolizing the sentence by means of explicit quantification over
moments. (...) Such symbolizations, however, are a considerable departure from the actual
form of the original sentences which they represent - which is unsatisfactory if we want to
gain insight into the semantics of English.” (1971: 231f)
5A similar example is discussed by Crossley and Humberstone (1977), concerning
modal logic and the modal indexical ‘actually’, rather than tense logic and the temporal
indexical ‘now’.
Split by PDF Splitter
Meaning, Context and Logical Truth 19
then, will be faded then. This reading is immediate in standard tense logic.
On another reading, (7) says that if something is flourishing (now), then
at some point in future, that thing will be faded. Now, one might point
out that this reading, too, can be handled in standard tense logic, namely,
by tampering with the scope that the quantifier and the temporal operator
respectively take. The tentative formal rendering of (7) could go as follows:
8 8x(flourishing(x)! FUT (faded(x)))
The cost, though, of proposing (8) as a way of formalizing (7) is that it in-
volves, as Kamp would say, “a considerable departure” from the syntax of
(7). But even if one is prepared to close one’s eyes on issues related to the
syntax/semantics interface, there is arguably a lingering, purely semantic
problem. Namely, there is yet a third reading that simple tense logic can-
not account for, viz. the “collective” reading on which (7) says that there
is some point in the future at which is faded everything that is flourishing
now; everything is faded together, if you wish. This third reading entails
(8), but note that (8) may be true even if there is no unique time at which
everything now flourishing is faded. Imagine that right now, the begonias
as well as the hortensias are flourishing, but that from now on, whenever
the begonias flourish, the hortensias fade, and when the begonias fade, the
hortenisas flourish, and so on ad infinitum. In that case, the formula in (8)
will come out true while (7) itself, under the reading under consideration,
ought to come out false.
The gist of these examples, and similar examples involving the modal
indexical ‘actually’, is to show that standard modal tense logic, with a sin-
gle time coordinate and a single possible world coordinate, is not rich and
powerful enough to handle certain natural language constructions. What is
more, not only do the overt indexicals such as ‘now’ pose a problem. For,
reconsider (3): the problematic construction is the present tense itself in ‘is
flourishing’.
The solution to the problem put forward in early 70’s, the “double-
indexing” solution, consists in taking the definition of truth to be relative
to two time coordinates, and similarly to two world coordinates. Taking S,
as before, to be a structure of interpretation, and f an assignment of values
to the free variables, here is what we get:
[[FUT']]Sw1;w2;t1;t2;f = T
iff for some t later than t1: [[']]Sw1;w2;t;t2;f = T
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[[NOW']]Sw1;w2;t1;t2;f = T
iff [[']]Sw1;w2;t2;t2;f = T
[[3']]Sw1;w2;t1;t2;f = T
iff for some w accessible from w1: [[']]Sw;w2;t1;t2;f = T
[[ACTUALLY ']]Sw1;w2;t1;t2;f = T
iff [[']]Sw2;w2;t1;t2;f = T
In other words, there are two time parameters, t1 and t2; t1 is the time of
evaluation, on which, as before, non-indexical tense operators such as FUT
operate, while the other time parameter, t2, is deployed in the definition of
indexical tense operators. What ‘now’ does is to reset the value for t1
by assigning to it the current value of t2. Similarly, there are two world
parameters, w1 and w2; w1 is the world of evaluation, on which, as before,
non-indexical modal operators such as 3 operate, while the other world
parameter, w2, supplies the value forw1 whenever the interpretation comes
upon the modal indexical ‘actually’.
With the indexical ‘now’ and the above definitions at our disposal, we
can account for that third, problematic reading of (7) by giving it the fol-
lowing formal rendering:
9 FUT 8x( NOW (flourishing(x))! faded(x))
It is not difficult to show that the truth conditions associated with (9) in
virtue of the proposed definitions of FUT and NOW capture the truth con-
ditions intuitively associated with (7) on the reading under consideration.
For, suppose that (7) is uttered at a certain time t, and consider what needs
to be the case for (9) to come out true when evaluated at t. There needs to
be a time later than t at which everything that was flourishing at t is faded.
Thus, for instance, in the scenario described above, if (9) is evaluated at
the time at which the begonias and the hortensias are flourishing, but after
which there is no time when they are (simultaneously) faded, (9) will come
out false.
3 The Logic of Indexicals
We have seen, in the last section, that context-dependence per se is not
inconsistent with a truth-conditional, model-theoretic approach to natural
language. It must be noted nevertheless that the kind of context-dependence
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that words such as ‘now’, ‘today’ or ‘actually’ manifest is special, in that
context-dependence is built into the word’s meaning itself. The meaning
of the word ‘now’ thus tells you that the time referred to by a given oc-
currence of this word is the time of the context in which the word is be-
ing used. Similarly, ‘today’ means that the day it picks out is the day of
the context. Words whose context-dependence is constitutive of their very
meaning are called indexicals and include, beside indexical temporal and
modal adverbs that we came across in the previous section, demonstrative
and personal pronouns such as ‘this’, ‘I’, ‘you’, etc.6 Indexicality is, then,
that sort of context-dependence which is lexically encoded, hence consti-
tutive of the very meaning of a given expression. If, in addition, we think
of logical truth as truth in virtue of meaning,7 the question arises of what
are the logical truths involving indexicals, and whether there are any inter-
esting such truths that are not already obtainable from standard logic (such
as “If it’s raining now, then it’s raining now”, which is arguably just an
instance of the logically valid schema '! ').
David Kaplan famously held that there is a non-standard logic of index-
icals. (Indeed, his interest in logic was one of the driving motivations for
his work on the semantics of indexicals.) Consider the following:
10 I am here now. (uttered by Kaplan on April 23, 1973 in Los Ange-
les).
Kaplan noted that (10) is “deeply, and somehow universally true” (un-
like the sentence “Kaplan is in Los Angeles on April 23, 1973”), because
“one need only understand [its] meaning to know that it cannot be uttered
falsely” (1977: 509), and concluded that (10) ought to come out logically
true. The logical framework that he devised incorporates double indexing,
but in addition to the world and the time parameter that are used in inter-
preting the modal indexical ‘actually’ and the temporal indexical ‘now’, he
6Indexicality is a more narrow phenomenon than context-dependence, which is ar-
guably ubiquitous and not always formally tractable. Some, like Travis (1996), have even
held that the phenomenon of context-dependence poses a major threat to the very enter-
prise of truth-conditional semantics. The view that context-dependence cannot be recon-
ciled with a truth-conditional, model-theoretic approach to meaning (which, in a way, was
Frege’s own view) is nowadays referred to as ‘radical contextualism’, and gave rise to some
debate in recent years. For discussion, see e.g. Recanati 2004, Predelli 2005, Preyer and
Peter (eds.) 2005, to mention only a few sources representing various sides of the debates.
7It is possible to consider truth in virtue of meaning as analytic truth, without necessar-
ily thinking that all analytic truths are logical truths or vice versa. For the sake of simplicity,
I shall not draw such a distinction between analytic and logical truth, to avoid the risk of
being taken astray.
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introduced an agent parameter, to be used in interpreting the first person
pronoun ‘I’, as well as a location parameter for ‘here’. The sequence of
those four parameters is what constitutes, in Kaplan’s framework, the pa-
rameter of context, with the proviso that only sequences (a, p, t, w) such
that the agent a is located at the location p at time t and in world w may
qualify as contexts. The full parametrization of truth, in this framework,
deploys a structure, a world and a time of evaluation, an assignment of val-
ues to free variables, and a context. From there, Kaplan defined a derived
notion of truth in a context as follows:
11 sentence ' is true in structure S, with respect to assignment f, in
context c iff [[']]Sc;w(c);t(c);f = T , where w(c) is the world of c and
t(c) is the time of c.
Given the definition in (11), and the above proviso on contexts, what is
peculiar about the sentence in (10) is that it comes out true in every context,
which is what makes it, as Kaplan would say, “somehow universally true”,
and endows it with the status of a logically valid sentence.
The putative logical validity of “I am here now” is one of the notorious
examples, but also one of the most controversial. The reason why Kaplan
thought that that sentence was logically valid is that he thought that its truth
was entirely warranted by the lexical meaning of the sentence. But he was
wrong in this respect. The truth of (10) is warranted by the lexical meaning
plus the additional assumption that the speaker must be located at the place
of utterance (=here) at the time of utterance (=now). That this is indeed an
additional assumption is clear from the fact that Kaplan only admits among
the contexts of his model-theoretic structures those quadruples (a, p, t, w)
that satisfy the proviso that a is located at p in w at t, i.e. such that the
pair (a, p) belongs to the value that the interpretation function of a given
structure yields when applied to the pair (t, w). But if such a stipulation is
required in order to make (10) come out logically valid, then the presumed
logical validity of this sentence is not very convincing to begin with. For, it
is clearly not a matter of logic, but an empirical matter, to determine who
is located where at what time. Yet, for Kaplan, this matter must be settled
before one can even decide whether something is an admissible structure
of interpretation for the logic of indexicals.8
8For further discussion of this problem, see Stojanovic (2008a): 41-43 and Predelli and
Stojanovic (2008). Let me add that the idea that “I am here now” is logically true has also
been challenged on the grounds that there may be true utterances of the negation of that
sentence, such as a message on an answering machine that says “I am not here now”.
Split by PDF Splitter
Meaning, Context and Logical Truth 23
Let us therefore look at another, somewhat less controversial example.
Consider:
12 If it is actually raining now in Mumbai, then it is raining in Mumbai.
To most ears, (12) will sound logically true (or valid). But the valid-
ity of (12), if validity there is, raises a problem. For, it is also plausible
to consider the following two rules to be truth-preserving, logically valid
rules:
the necessitation rule: if ' is valid, then 2' is also valid
the eternalization rule: if ' is valid, then ALWAYS ' is valid
Applied to (12), the rules will give us that the following sentence is also
a truth of logic:
13 Necessarily, it is always the case that if it’s actually raining in Mum-
bai now, then it’s raining in Mumbai.
But this is, as Kaplan pointed out, an unwelcome consequence. Suppose
that it is actually raining in Mumbai now. Then it follows from (13) that
it’s always raining in Mumbai in all possible worlds. But it isn’t always
raining in Mumbai. Hence (13) cannot be true.
One of the achievements of Kaplan’s work, and of the double-indexing
strategy more generally, is to provide a way of making sentences such as
in (12), and, more generally, instances of the schema (14) below, logically
true, without ipso facto making (13) and, more generally, instances of (15)
below, true:
14 ACTUALLY NOW (p)! p
15 2 ALWAYS (ACTUALLY NOW (p)! p)
Assume a semantics that deploys two world parameters and two time
parameters, as in the framework outlined in section 2, and consider the
following definition of validity (or logical truth):
Def. 1. Sentence ' is valid if, and only if, for every structure S, every
assignment function f , and for every world w and every time t, we have:
[[']]Sw;w;t;t;f = T
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This definition, in a way, collapses the two parameters when it comes
to defining logical truth.9 To see this, contrast Def. 1 with the following
alternative definition:
Def. 2. Sentence ' is valid if, and only if, for every structure S, every
assignment function f , and for all worlds w1, w2 and all times t1, t2, we
have: [[']]Sw1;w2;t1;t2;f = T
Note that on neither definition does (15) come out valid. However, only
on Def. 1 are sentences such as (14) valid. On Def. 2, (14) is not valid
precisely because the truth of ‘actually now (p)’ will depend on w2 and t2,
while the truth of p alone depends on w1 and t1. And since there is no
correlation between w1 and w2, or between t1 and t2, the antecedent of the
entailment in (14) may be true while the consequent is false.
How should one adjudicate between the two definitions? Is it even cor-
rect to assume that there is one correct definition of validity in this case?
For it may be that there are two equally valid notions of validity, so to
speak: the one that corresponds to truth in every context, and the other that
corresponds to truth for all assignments of values to all the parameters to
which truth is relative, and that allows that different worlds serve as the
world of evaluation and the world of the context; and similarly for times.
The primary aim of this paper was not to answer these questions, but rather,
to raise them and revive them as open issues for further investigation that
lie at the interface of semantics, logic and philosophy of language 10.
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